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1 Introduction
The Napoleonic Wars engulfed a Germany that consisted of more than three hundred
independent territories and set it on a path of unication which culminated in the
founding of the German Empire in 1871. However, before Germany saw political unity,
it experienced economic unication, especially the creation of a common market. The
institutional centerpiece that swept away most trade barriers between German states
was the Zollverein, a customs union founded in 1834.
C.F.Nebenius, a public ocial in Baden and vocal advocate of the Zollverein, saw
moral improvement as the major benet of this customs union for regions close to
internal German borders. He envisioned reductions in the temptation to smuggle,
and more peaceful relations with neighboring regions, due to decreased potential for
conict (Nebenius, 1835). However, he did not address the dierential economic
impact. What were the eects on economic activity in regions close to and far from
the borders?
The Zollverein was the rst major customs unions and represents a historical case
of peaceful border elimination, where economic unication predates the political de-
velopment.1 This customs union fostered economic integration in Germany through
reducing many transaction costs, harmonizing measures, weights, currencies, and laws
and especially through eliminating internal tari borders. This creation of a unied
German market led to an increase in the number and size of regional markets traders
could access. This leads to the question how this institution aected the spatial
location of economic activity within the states. Recent cross-country literature on
the eects of trade agreements (Rose, 2004; Estevadeordal, Frantz and Taylor, 2003),
or related institutions like currency agreements(Lopez-Cordova and Meissner, 2003),
focus on the eects on the states as a whole, similarly Keller and Shiue (2008) in-
vestigates the price integration eect of the Zollverein between states. Shiue (2005)
additionally shows that the Zollverein had an impact on market integration within
a state. This paper focuses on the internal impact of the Zollverein, and is more in
line with work on the eects of regional agreements like Nafta (Hanson, 1996). The
theoretical basis for this is a model based on the new economic geography (Krugman,
1991). In particular I utilize Redding and Sturm 2008, which generalizes Helpman
1Economic unication was not the proximate cause for political unication, which was clearly
military conict. However the high level of economic integration had substantial inuence on the
success of political integration after the wars.(Rothe, Ritthaler and Oncken, 1934)
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(1998) and formulates it in terms of market and supplier access (Redding and Ven-
ables, 2004). This theoretical framework links location size with market access and
location fundamentals. Therefore I use the growth of towns in Saxony, one of the
member states of the Zollverein, around its entry into the customs union in 1834
to identify eects of this institution on local and regional activity. This allows the
analysis to be on a ner geographical level than alternative measures like GDP data
or trade ows as well as solves the problem of non-existent or low quality historical
data.
The bases of this investigation are increasing returns and agglomeration economies.
International trade patterns at the onset of the industrial revolution t Heckscher-
Ohlin patterns (O'Rourke and Williamson, 2005), which raises the question whether
the economic structures at the time allowed for increasing returns and agglomeration
economies, at least in local and regional patterns. If the impact of the Zollverein
corresponds to predictions implied by a new economic geography framework, it fol-
lows that increasing returns were already at work in the early stages of the industrial
revolution that were not yet dominated by large-scale manufacturing structures and
large urban agglomerations.
The focus on the eect of changes in market access requires a notion of transport
costs between markets. Recent work has shown that the specic formulation of this
factor matters (Bosker and Garretsen, 2008). I incorporate geography and infras-
tructure into the measured distance between markets using Geographic Information
Systems (GIS) methods to create a more precise measure than the commonly used
plain great circle distance. Population data serve as the outcome variables and are
used with the distance measure to create empirical market access measures. The
source is a newly collected dataset on historical population and town characteristics
within Saxony and neighbouring states. Additionally geographic and institutional
town characteristics are introduced into the estimations to control for the inuence
of institutional factors and location fundamentals.
The results of the empirical estimation, which makes use of dierences in tari
changes depending on the particular neighbour state, show clearly that the Zollverein
had a substantial, dierential impact on regional growth of urban population. This
implies that the central mechanisms, market access and agglomeration economies,
were already at work at the onset of the industrial revolution. Furthermore it shows
how institutional changes shaped the location of economic activity, which had a lasting
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impact for the development of the economy during the industrialization process into
modern times.
Section 2 provides an outline of the historical context for Saxony and the Zol-
lverein. Section 3 describes the theoretical framework, the New Economic Geography
model from Redding and Sturm (2008), and derives implications which will be tested
in the empirical section. Section 4 illustrates the changes in tari barriers through
Saxony's entry into the Zollverein. Section 5 details the GIS-based distance measure
as well as the data set and the methods used in the empirical analysis. Section 6
illustrates the results of the main analysis and a series of extensions investigating
particular aspects of the eects. Section 7 provides a closer look at the distance
measures and the nal section concludes.
2 Historical Context
Saxony existed as a political entity for centuries within the Holy Roman Empire of the
German nation. It was one of the larger German powers at the time of the Napoleonic
Wars, located between Prussia and the Austrian province Bohemia (Keller, 2002). Its
central location within continental Europe, which had made it a center of trade, also
led to its involvement in the Napoleonic Wars. Saxony emerged with substantial terri-
torial losses to Prussia but only minor changes to economic and political institutions.
At the Congress of Vienna, Saxony became a member of the Deutsche Bund, a
political institution established there by the German states.2 Although its original
charter contained the mandate to work for a customs and economic union, no sig-
nicant further attempts were made by the Deutsche Bund to achieve these goals.3
When some German states began to form customs unions, starting in 1828 with the
Bavarian-Wuerttemberg union and the treaty between Prussia and Hesse-Darmstadt,
Saxony became one of the main initiators of the Mitteldeutscher Handelsverein, a
defensive agreement between most of the remaining German states.4 Although some
2 This organization had predominantly security related powers through the creation of a military
structure to coordinate the armed forces of its members states as well as common policies to quell
any domestic political unrest (Angelow, 2003; Müller, 2006)
3 Henderson (1984) provides a historical overview, see Ploeckl (2010b) for an explanation why
the German states, especially Prussia, preferred regional agreements over a multilateral approach
for the whole of Germany.
4 Its specic aims were to prevent the further expansion of the other customs unions through a
commitment of its members states not to join any of them, not to raise taris or impede existing
trade roads against each other as well as the coordination of further infrastructure development.
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of the architects of the Mitteldeutscher Handelsverein had hoped that it could serve
as a vehicle for negotiations with other customs unions about a common union for
all of Germany, Prussia refused any such advances. Further developments, such as
the impending merger of the two existing customs unions, led Saxony to fear Prus-
sian dominance of its trade routes with other nations and possible complete exclusion
from German and foreign markets. Negotiations between Prussia and Saxony were
opened up and successfully concluded after a merger agreement between the already
existing German customs unions. The Zollverein, now a customs union encompassing
a signicant number of German states, came ocially into being with the year 1834.5
The Zollverein lifted all internal tari barriers, instituted a common external cus-
toms system and applied a distribution system for tari revenues based on member
states' population. Policies were set by a regular congress of its member states, where
each member had veto power due to a unanimity requirement. The Zollverein speci-
ed administrative regulations but the actual policing and legal enforcement were still
the prerogative of each member state individually. The customs union showed con-
siderable institutional persistence, remaining virtually unchanged for over 30 years.
Prussia forced changes in its institutional structure in the wake of the Prussian-
Austrian war of 1866 and incorporated the customs union into the political structure
of the German Empire of 1871 (Hahn, 1984; Henderson, 1984).6
At the time of the Zollverein Saxony was a region with one of the highest pop-
ulation densities as well as urbanization rates within Germany (Kiesewetter, 2007).
Most of its towns had already been established between the 11th and the 16th century
(Blaschke, 1967). These medieval roots gave rise to a development of institutional
details, which saw settlements gradually acquire certain rights, like court rights or
political representation. Over time a set of towns developed which were recognized as
such, for example, with regard to excise tax regulations. In 1832 the Saxon govern-
ment reformed the relevant laws concerning municipal administration and governance
and introduced the Staedteordnung, which clearly outlined a uniform set of adminis-
trative rules for towns. This also conrmed a clear institutional separation between
towns and villages and reinforced stability of the set of locations classied as towns
(Blaschke, 1967).
5 Ploeckl (2010b) provides a structural analysis of the formation process of the Zollverein, which
explains the observed negotiation structure, accession sequence and institutional form. Henderson
(1984) provides an overview of the history of the Zollverein.
6 Prussia annexed a number of other member states in 1866, abolished the congress and its
unanimity rules and instituted a customs parliament which was dominated by its Prussian members.
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3 Theoretical Framework and Implications
Saxon towns were therefore clearly dened centers of economic activity as well as
trade. Any framework for investigating the impact of tari liberalization on popula-
tion growth must take this into account. Helpman (1998) develops a theoretical model
incorporating production and trade between two locations to explain mechanisms
leading to regional dierentiation with regard to the size of each region. Redding and
Sturm (2008) takes up this framework and extends it to a multi-region setting, which
can be interpreted as a system of individual towns. They use it to investigate the
eects of the German separation after World War II. This paper uses this model as
the theoretical framework to investigate Saxony's urban structure and the eects of
the Zollverein.
It incorporates the urban population as a mass of representative consumers, la-
beled L, and has each consumer living in a specic location c, which I take to be all
towns within Saxony.7 Consumers provide labor, the sole factor of production, for
which they receive a location specic wage. Locations produce horizontally dieren-
tiated manufacturing goods with the dierentiation of these varieties based on the
Dixit-Stiglitz form8 and the production process for each variety has a xed cost, F ,
and a constant marginal cost. All varieties are produced under monopolistic com-
petition and are completely tradable between locations. Trading requires a cost for
shipping, which is modeled as the standard iceberg trading cost.9 Each location is
endowed with a stock of a non-tradable amenity Hc, the level of which is exogenously
given for each location.10 The amenity is supplied perfectly inelastic for consumption
by consumers at the location; the total expenditure on the amenity is redistributed
to the consumers. The utility function of each consumer has the Cobb-Douglas form,
with an index of manufacturing varieties and the amenity as the two consumption
inputs.11 The demand from all locations for goods from location c, which is the total
market size for these goods, is summarized as rm market access FMAc, while the
7This is a xed number, which corresponds to the point that the set of towns was stable during
the time period in question.
8This implies a constant elasticity of substitution σ between the varieties.
9So Tic > 1 units of the goods have to be shipped from location i, such that exactly one unit
arrives in location c.
10 Helpman gives housing as a motivating example for this modeling choice.
11This leads each consumer to allocate a share µ, with 0 < µ < 1 of her income to purchases of
manufacturing goods and a share of 1− µ for the local amenity.
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total supply of varieties in location c is formally dened as consumer market access
CMAc:
Full labor mobility leads to real wage equalization, which is used to link the
population distribution with the dened market access measures and the stock of the






where χ is a function of model parameters and the common real wage.12
This equilibrium equation provides the theoretical link between population size
and the idea of agglomeration economies, represented as market access, as well as the
importance of location fundamentals, modeled as the local amenity. These two factors
represent two of the three main strands of explanation used in the vast literature on
city size (Davis and Weinstein, 2002). The third approach, random growth, focuses
on a statistical explanation of the properties of the city size distribution, especially
on Zipf's law, as the outcome of a random growth process (Gabaix, 1999).13 The
theoretical framework focuses on the other two, but these theories will not be tested
here.14 Ploeckl (2009) uses this model framework to test for the importance of market
access and location characteristics for the size of towns, which is conrmed by the
analysis.
The model provides an explanation for dierential urban growth. The equilibrium
equation implies that dierential growth between towns can be caused by changes in
any of three dierent factors. An increase in rm market access implies a higher de-
mand for local products, which leads to a higher nominal wage. The rise in nominal
wages leads to a rise in the real wage, which attracts labor from other towns. This
immigration leads to a higher price of the non-traded amenity until this price in-
12 χ ≡ ω−1/(1−µ)ξµ/(1−/mu)µ/(1− µ), where ω is the common real wage, ξ ≡ (F (σ− 1))−1/σ(σ−
1)/σ, F is the xed cost for a variety, σ the elasticity of substitution, and µ the expenditure share
of tradeables.
13 Zipf's law describes the occurrence of a power law in the distribution of city size such that the
size of the s-th largest town is 1s times the size of the largest town overall. This relationship implies
that a plot of the log of the rank versus the log of the size exhibits slope of -1 .
14 Beeson, DeJong and Troesken (2001) gives a short description of the dierences between the
location fundamentals and the agglomeration approach. The rst sees productivity as exogenous,
with dierences stemming from dierences in resource endowments. Unequal population growth is
then the adjustment to a steady state. The second sees productivity as endogenous. While initial
dierences might be due to natural advantages, further growth is then driven by agglomeration
economics including economies of scale. The model ts both explanations; the rst sees any changes
only caused by the local amenity H, and the second assumes H to be xed and any change is due
to market access.
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crease equalizes the real wage again and ends the immigration. Similarly, an increase
in consumer market access implies a decrease in the price paid for manufacturing
varieties and equals, therefore, a rise in the real wage. The resulting immigration of
labor leads again to a price increase of the non-traded amenity until the real wage is
equalized and the population distribution is again in equilibrium. A direct increase of
the local non-traded amenity results in a drop in the amenity's price and therefore in
an increase in the real wage. Again, an increase in population at this location raises
the price of the amenity and leads to the equilibrium real wage equalization.
The model linkage implies that urban population growth represents growth of
the extent of economic activity in the town. The nature of the production process
implies that urban population reects the quantity, though not necessarily the value,
of goods produced in the town, population growth therefore represents an increase in
the absolute amount of goods produced directly. The link between urban population
growth and individual productivity growth depends on which of three channels caused
the population growth. If rm market access increased, then the value of the goods
produced in the location increased, so urban population growth reects an increase in
individual productivity.15 If changes to consumer market access or the amenity are the
source of population growth, then individual productivity is not directly aected.16
Consumer welfare is also aected by dierential urban population growth. Changes to
any of three channels cause a discrete change in welfare, urban population growth is
then the mechanism which brings the resulting dierential welfare between locations
back to equality, which has to hold due to full labor mobility. So an increase in
market access leads to a higher relative utility for consumers in the aected location,
the resulting relative higher population growth in these location is reducing utility
until its the same as in the other locations.17
The impact on the equilibrium population distribution through the three chan-
nels  rm market access, consumer market access and location characteristics  is
15Urban growth is directly reecting individual productivity growth, but only as a resulting con-
sequence. Individual productivity increased and as a consequence the town grows relatively faster
until the new equilibrium has been reached.
16Individual productivity might be aected through a second-order eect if the range of varieties
produced does not increase proportionally with population growth. The increasing returns setup for
production implies an increase in individual productivity when the range of varieties increases less
than the total supply of labor.
17This reduction eect might be a possible explanation for the anthropometric evidence, which
sees a reduction of heights for people born after the Zollverein (Cinnirella, 2008).
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summarized in the following equation, where X is the equilibrium before any change,




















The town population should increase when rm market access, consumer market
access or the location characteristics increase.
The eect on growth is a function of the relative change in market access, which
has implications for the strength of the eect for small and large towns. Total market
access is the sum of individual market access in other locations as well as the town
itself. If two towns have the same market access in other locations, then the larger
town has a higher total market access due to the larger home market FMAXLarge >
FMAXSmall. A change in trade barriers increases market access for both by the same
absolute amount, FMA∆ = FMA
Y
Large − FMAXLarge = FMAYSmall − FMAXSmall,










. Since the relationship between market access growth and population
growth is positive, this relatively higher change in market access implies a stronger
relative growth eect for smaller towns.18
A further implication of the model, which is not tested by Redding and Sturm
(2008), is the reinforcement of a shock to market access through the impact on markets
in the proximity. If a town experiences a sudden increase in market access, then other
towns close by will also experience the shock and grow faster as a result. This positive
growth in proximate towns will then cause additional growth in the rst town beyond
the immediate eect of the shock. Similarly, a negative shock will also be reinforced.
4 Tari Barriers
The main impact the Zollverein had by altering tari barriers between Saxony and
its neighbors19 was a change to market access. Its precise impact on Saxon towns de-
pended on the tari systems before the customs union as well as the newly introduced
regulations.
Prior to the Zollverein, Saxony had no external border tari system, but levied
excise taxes.20 The main element of the taxation system was a general excise tax,
18 This relationship also holds for consumer market access.
19See Map 1 for their relative geographical position.
20 It levied such a tax on a few imports, but the extent was very minor (Ulbricht, 2001).
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the so-called General-Konsumtions-Akzise (Reuschel, 1930).21 This tax was levied
on almost all commercial transactions; some of its regulations also resembled land or
income taxes. Its main focus was trading and production within towns. The excise
was levied on any good entering the town, with immediate payment required at the
town gate, and therefore resembled a tari barrier around each town. The national
character of this tax implies that the levied rates were identical for all towns.
Saxony's entry into the Zollverein in 1834 forced a complete overhaul of the tax
system including the abolishment of the main excise tax. Although there were still a
few indirect taxes, especially production and consumption taxes on consumer goods
like beer, wine and meat, the system saw a major shift towards direct taxes. A
personal and a commercial tax on income were introduced in 1834, and a new property
tax was established in 1843 (Engel, 1858).
Facing huge war debts after the Napoleonic Wars, many German states turned to
taris to raise revenues. Prussia, bordering Saxony in the north, reformed its tari
system in 1818, abolishing over 50 internal tari lines, establishing an external tari
system and simplifying the tari structure. Although the initial intentions were tari
rates of about 10%, the actual rates grew considerably higher than that, predom-
inantly due to the tari being specic and not value-based (Ohnishi, 1973).22 At
the same time, Bavaria, Saxony's neighbor in the south west, introduced an external
tari system with relatively high tari rates (Alber, 1919). Saxony's neighbor to the
south, the Austrian province of Bohemia, had a prohibitive tari system, restricting
signicantly any form of trade between the two states (Kiesewetter, 2007). However,
the geography of this border, the mountain range of the Erzgebirge, posed problems
for border enforcement, especially since Saxony itself did not even have a border sys-
tem. Prior to Saxony's entry into the Zollverein there was considerable smuggling
activity along the border. The introduction of the Zollverein regulations led to a
severe crackdown on the contraband trade between Saxony and Austria (Kiesewetter,
2007). The Thuringian principalities had neither the size nor administrative capacity
to run external tari systems (Dumke, 1994). Their main tari revenues were transit
21 It had been instituted during the rst decade of the 18th century when it replaced a head tax.
The existence of this tax was a success of Prince Friedrich August I over the Saxon estates, since
their members, who had far-reaching tax exemption privileges under the previous system, were liable
to pay this tax, making it fairly universal.
22 Additionally, the Prussian system levied the highest rates on nished goods, while there were
almost no barriers for raw materials, a feature which was later retained in the Zollverein tari
structure (Dumke, 1994).
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tolls on the main east-west trade routes connecting the major trade fairs of Leipzig
and Frankfurt.
The Zollverein of 1834 created a common external tari, abolished internal taris
and lowered transaction costs through measurement and currency harmonization.
The tari rates and some of the administrative regulations were based predominantly
on Prussian tari rules. This led to moderate to high taris, especially on nished
as well as consumption goods, and to the introduction of considerably more rigorous
controls on most borders.
In the case of Saxony, the Zollverein regulations completely dropped barriers with
Prussia, Bavaria and the Thuringian principalities, while it raised barriers for traders
from Bohemia, aecting the supply relationships of Saxon towns (Dumke, 1994; Hen-
derson, 1984).
5 Data and Estimation
Before outlining the specications for the empirical tests of the Zollverein eects, I
detail the data and variables used for the three main factors: urban growth; market
access measures; and location characteristics. A discussion of the calculations leading
to the GIS-based distance measure is also included.
The size and growth of cities and towns, along with population density and the
extent of urbanization, have been linked to economic development (Bairoch, 1988;
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2002). This connection allows their use as outcome
variables to investigate economic growth patterns and to test explanatory factors for
dierential growth (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005; De Long and Shleifer,
1993). This approach has two advantages in the case of the Zollverein and Saxon
towns. First, I am able to focus on regional development on a disaggregated level.
Second, it avoids the use of arbitrary borders due to the availability of sucient data.
Saxon towns, at the onset of the industrial revolution, still had quite clear bound-
aries, in some cases literally physical walls. Their population, based on administrative
boundaries, therefore represents the size of the local economies quite well (Blaschke,
1967; Hohenberg and Lees, 1985).23 Town boundaries see almost no change during the
time period in question; the extent of the incorporation of villages into towns is neg-
23 This feature of Saxon towns solves the problem of delineating appropriate urban areas, since, es-
pecially in the 20th century, administrative boundaries no longer coincide with meaningful economic
units (Blaschke, 1967).
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ligible before the late 19th century (Wächter, 1901). Most papers apply a size-based
approach to identifying towns, based either on absolute or on relative size (Bairoch,
1988). I use a legal denition and include all settlements that had the legal status
as a town according to the law of 1832. This creates an institutionally homogeneous
set of 140 towns, which is stable over time.24 This institutional homogeneity avoids
problems due to the economic eects of dierent legal environments between towns
and other settlements.
The population dataset contains the years 1815, 1830 and 1834, every third year
following until 1867, and ends with 1871. There is a systematic dierence between the
rst two years, 1815 and 1830, and the rest of the data due to the method underlying
the data creation. The rst two counts are based on tax rolls, while the others are
results of population censuses held every three years.25. The data show a signicant
discrepancy between the 1830 and 1834 numbers, with 1830 exhibiting considerable
undercounting. I use the 1815/1830 numbers only to calculate the growth rate for
this period, but not in combination with any other year.26
The model characterizes towns through the specication of an exogenously given,
non-traded amenityHc. Since there is no single characteristic that explains urban size,
I interpret this variable as a combination of location characteristics which inuence
the location decision of population. I divide these characteristics into two classes 
one being natural endowments and the other institutional factors.
The rst category contains variables that indicate the natural characteristics of
a town location. These are geographic factors such as elevation, ruggedness of the
surrounding area, access to owing water, and specically whether the town is located
on the Elbe, the only major navigable river in Saxony; all of these are based on
contemporary data from modern Geographic Information systems.27 Another set are
24 In 1848, Saxony received a town, Schirgiswalde, through a land swap with Austria, and in the
second half of the 19th century two more villages were granted town rights. At the moment, I do
not include them as towns in the analysis, but their population is used in calculating the size of
rural markets.
25 These censuses were required for the revenue distribution scheme of the Zollverein (Wächter,
1901)
26 One complicating factor is the presence of military personnel, which obviously does not nec-
essarily follow economic incentives based on local wage levels in their location decision. I therefore
exclude such personnel from the population counts, but do use information about the relative size
of their presence as an independent variable. The population data are primarily taken from an
overview article in the 1901 issue of the Zeitschrift des K.Saechsischen Statistischen Buereaus, a
periodical of the Saxon Statistical oce, as well as from other publications by the Statistical oce.
27 Elevation is measured in meters above sea level, ruggedness is measured as the standard devi-
ation of the elevation within a 2km radius around the town, and access to owing water indicates
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natural and climatic factors such as rain, temperature and the quality of the soil for
pasture and farming, all of which come from extensive geological and climatic surveys
conducted during the middle of the 20th century.28 This is complemented by natural
resource variables, specically the distance to the nearest coal mines and the share
of public mining authority employees in the town population, which is related to the
extent of other mining activity around the town. Historically natural characteristics
also inuence the location of military installations, which is measured by the amount
of military personnel in a town. These location characteristics are generally not
subject to change over time. This alleviates any problem of a possible endogeneity
with regard to size or growth of a town .
Next to these unchanging location characteristics I include a set of variables repre-
senting institutional factors, which are for the most part related to, but not necessarily
causally given by, the specic geographic location. These factors include information
about transportation, for example whether the town had a post oce and, later, a
railroad station. Another set relates to the idea of human capital, measured by the
presence of the regular publishing of a newspaper or a magazine, the number of chil-
dren per school as well as per teacher in each town, and the presence of other higher
education institutions.29 This is complemented by information on whether trade fairs
for general goods, textiles or animals were held in each town as well as the stock
of housing.30 These characteristics are used together with the rst set as the repre-
sentation of the local amenity in specications investigating growth patterns. Table
1 reports summary statistics, a more detailed description of each characteristic, as
well as the sources and variable specications, are given in the appendix. The third
factor required to derive empirical specications for the model implications is market
access. Some econometric specications will use a population-based empirical market
potential variable for this. Hanson (2005), among others, uses market potential as
the empirical proxy for market access in his work on the impact of NAFTA. This
follows the approach pioneered by Harris (1954), who calculated this measure as the





, where Mi signies
whether a river is within a kilometer of the town.
28 The surveys classify each location on a scale between 0 and 100, with higher values indicating
better suitability for agricultural purposes.
29 This could be a university, a seminary or a teacher college.
30 I construct a measure of housing stock in the following way. I regress the total number of
houses on a polynomial of town size, residuals from this regression are then used as the independent
variable.
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a measure of the size of the market and dci is the distance to this market.
31 I use
urban and rural markets in Saxony as well as urban markets abroad and take their
respective population as the market size.
• Urban Market in Saxony This set contains all towns within Saxony, which, in
1834, ocially had 523563 inhabitants. The model includes the town itself as
part of its market access, which leads to the dierential impact of market access
changes based on town size.
• Foreign urban markets Although the legal regulations dier, towns are also cen-
ters of economic activity in Saxony's neighbor states, and therefore represent
the relevant foreign markets for Saxon towns. The set consists of towns within
a 100km radius around Saxony. The total market abroad can be split into indi-
vidual parts according to country, which results in variables indicating markets
in Prussia, Thuringia, Bavaria, and Bohemia, respectively.
• Rural Markets in Saxony Each town has a "hinterland", a set of villages in a
close economic relationship with a specic town (Blaschke 1967). To determine
the size of this market, I assign each village in Saxony to its nearest town neigh-
bor.32 The rural market size for each town is then the sum of the population of
all villages for which this town is the nearest town neighbor.33
My approach to distance measurement is related to the use of either road dis-
tance, travel time or transportation cost (Brakman, Garretsen and Schramm, 2004;
Harris, 1954) measures, which implicitly include some cost factors.34 There are no
31 There are various market size measures used in the literature. Harris, for example, took retail
sales, Hanson used income as measured by GDP, De Vries (1984) uses population. Another problem
for distance measurement is the issue of specifying respective end points for distance measurement,
especially if the underlying units of observation, for example regions or countries, cover extended
areas (Head and Mayer, 2002). Historical towns covered a relatively limited area, so the intra-town
transport costs paled in contrast to inter-town costs (Barker and Gerhold, 1995), which makes the
issue moot in this context.
32 Depending on the empirical specication, this assignment is based on either plain distance or
the cost measure developed in this paper.
33 This sum is not weighted by distance, since the nature of the economic relationship between
town and countryside outweighs the importance of the relatively short distances between towns and
the surrounding villages.
34 Bosker and Garretsen (2008) surveys varying functional specications to include cost factors,
showing that trade costs are either modeled as a direct function of the measured distance or as a
two-step estimation. The latter uses other trade data, especially trade ows, to back out cost factors
such as border eects or being landlocked, and combines these with distance measurements. Given
the absence of trade ow data, I follow a direct approach, by specifying the trade cost function as a
power function of distance.
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comprehensive historical travel time or transportation cost measures for Saxony and
its neighboring regions. Historical transportation technology, furthermore, depended
strongly on geographical factors.35
I calculate a cost measure using GIS methods to incorporate various cost modiers
to account for this dependence.36 The main elements included are transportation
infrastructure, predominantly roads and river shipping, as well as elevation, which
increases distance traveled and causes changes in transportation costs through the
obstacles associated with slopes. The calculation, which is described in more detail
in the appendix, separates the surface into a ne raster and derives for each cell a
cost value for the travel over this particular cell. The optimization process nds the
least costly path between two grid locations, where the cost of crossing raster cells
between the two locations is associated with the respective cost value and elevation
level of each cell. The parameters for these costs are also explained in the appendix.
The outcome value is a relative distance measure, where the benchmark is travel on
at, highest quality roads. So, a distance cost value of 50km between town A and B
implies that traveling from A to B is as expensive as traveling 50km on a completely
at and straight road of the highest contemporary quality.
In most cases the cost value is higher than the plain distance value between two
points, and it is asymmetric due to cost asymmetries associated with dierences in the
elevation and slope of the two travel directions between the two points. The magni-
tude of this eect of geography is relatively small, since it depends on the existence of
signicant elevation dierences between the two towns. A possible signicant source
for these dierences in the case of Saxony and its neighbors is the Erzgebirge, the
range of mountains to the south of Saxony, along the border with Bohemia. However,
the relatively low height of these mountains and the small number of aected towns
keep these dierences relatively small. A major source of asymmetry, which is not
included in the distance calculation, is the dierential trade barriers between the two
towns. The dierences in trading regimes between Saxony and its neighbors, as de-
scribed above, are such barriers.37 The asymmetry of the distance measure, dic ̸= dci,
35 There are of course other factors which inuence transaction costs, in particular cultural and
social factors like dierent languages.(Shiue, 2005). However Saxony and its neighbour states had
the same language, had no major ethnic dierences and had in general fairly strong cultural, social
and institutional similarities.
36Similar methods have been used in other academic disciplines, for example for the calculation
of catchment areas in archaeology or epidemiology.
37 Obviously, these only aect trade with foreign states, not domestic markets.
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implies asymmetric transportation costs in the model, since these are uniquely deter-
mined by the distance and travel direction. However, without trade barriers between
the two locations, the extent of asymmetry is such that the two trade costs between
the locations are highly correlated.38
The eectiveness of this new distance measure is investigated by comparing it to
the regular plain distance. All empirical specications include the distance measure
in some form, therefore all specications are estimated twice, once for my measure as
well as for plain distance.39
5.1 Empirical specications
The main empirical question asks what impact the Zollverein had on urban popu-
lation growth patterns through its eect on towns' market access. Saxony's entry
into the Zollverein had multiple eects. It caused an increase in rm market access
through removing trade barriers for Saxon exporters to the neighboring Zollverein
member states. It reduced consumer market access by introducing stronger barriers
against imports from Bohemia. This implies that towns more directly aected by the
liberalization of borders with fellow Zollverein members should see stronger growth,
while towns more aected by the imposition of barriers against Bohemia should see
the opposite.
The initial specication looks at the connection between the change in size, as
measured by the change in population growth rates, and the change in market access,





Marketcl/MarketcPre + εc (3)
where ∆GrowthPre represent the change in towns' growth rates, Marketcl is town c's
market potential in market l, in particular those in Thuringia, Bohemia, Prussia and
the domestic urban market in Saxony. MarketPre is the market access prior to the
Zollverein. This specication is tested for both distance measures, absolute as well as
relative change in growth rates, as well as the minimal (only domestic) and maximal
38 This implies that some empirical specications utilizing distance, for example those using market
potential, will be specied with only one market access measure, not separate rm and customer
access measures.
39 Distance measures are used in the calculation of market potential, the treatment thresholds in
the dierence-in-dierence specication described below, the distance to coal mines variables, and
in the weighting matrices in the spatial econometrics extension.
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(domestic and international) market access prior to the Zollverein.
The theoretical model assumes each town to be aected according to the size of
the relevant market access. Although I use market potential as a proxy for market
access not only in this initial specication but also in a number of extensions, in the
main empirical specication I model the eect of the Zollverein as a discrete eect; a
town is either aected or it is not. The choice of this discreet approach is made with
the purpose of robustness based on the nature of the liberalized tari barriers. The
specic nature of the Prussian taris and the Thuringian tolls imply that the barrier
was not proportional to good values, and therefore transport costs.40 The distinct
and discrete nature of the tari barriers imply that they are relatively stronger for
goods with low relative transport costs, i.e those produced close to the border.
Redding and Sturm (2008) establishes a correlation between the impact on a
town`s growth and its distance to border through a simulation exercise, which is then
empirically tested estimating a dierence-in-dierence specication. The treatment
group is based on town`s distance to border, with the threshold derived from the
simulation. For the case of the Zollverein the given data prevent a similar simulation
exercise, therefore I begin by using a moving threshold. The treatment group for
the initial dierence-in-dierence specication is chosen based on town`s geographical
proximity to a specic border segment, in particular Saxony's borders with the other
Zollverein states. The estimation will be repeated moving the distance threshold
used to determine the treatment group further from the border in each step. The
results establish whether the liberalization through the Zollverein had a signicant
dierential eect on growth for towns close to the border.
My main specication modies this initial approach in two ways. First, I in-
vestigate the eect of the Zollverein in more geographic detail, introducing separate
treatment categories for the individual border parts with Prussia, Thuringia41 and
Bohemia. Second, I select the distance thresholds based on a grid search.42 Addi-
40The proportionality of transport costs rests on the regular assumption of iceberg trading costs.
41The Bavarian border is not included to its short length and signicant distance from Saxon
towns. As a robustness check I also ran the analysis including the Bavarian part in the Thuringian
section, which did not change the results.
42 For this search I use threshold values between 5km and 35km for the plain distance to border
and between 10km and 70km for the cost measure, which will be introduced in the data section.
The doubling of the values for the cost measure is due the relation between the average distances of
both measures, which is somewhat over 2. The upper bound is slightly below half of the threshold
value Redding and Sturm nd for the eect of the German separation. This reduction is justied
by the improvements of transportation technology between the Zollverein and the German separa-
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tionally this approach reveals information not only about the change through the
Zollverein, but also distinguishes the eects working before and after the customs
union entry.









where subscript t denotes a time period, Border is a dummy which indicates whether
the town is assumed to be aected through the Zollverein,PreZollverein indicates the
time before the Zollverein, and Zollverein the time after Saxony's entry . Subscript l
indicates a specic border segment, either Prussia, Thuringia or Bohemia. δt are time
dummies, µr denotes regional dummies and ϵt are stochastic errors. βl and γl, the
coecients on the interaction of the treatment groups and time periods, are the main
coecients of interest since they illuminate the eect of the Zollverein. The initial
investigation uses two time periods, 1815-1830 before the Zollverein and 1834-1849
after the entry.
The baseline specication focuses on growth solely due to a change in market
access. However, the model implies that dierential population growth can also be
the outcome of changes in the local amenity.43. To see whether this is the case around
Saxony's entry into the Zollverein, I include the full set of location fundamentals as
controls into the main specication. These controls are interacted with an indicator
for Saxony's entry into the Zollverein to investigate whether the impact of a certain
location characteristic changes between the periods.
Furthermore the model does not make any predictions about the speed of adjust-
ment. The data however allow to investigate the adjustment path over time based on
the main dierence-in-dierence baseline specication. I do this through the inclusion
of multiple periods after the Zollverein entry following the development of the eect
over time. In particular I include four time periods of nine years44to illuminate the
change in the eect more clearly.
In contrast to the adjustment path the model contains implications about the
tion a century later as demonstrated byShiue (2005) who found the border eect of the Zollverein
magnitudes smaller than contemporary eects. The selection criterion is the adjusted R2
43 Some location characteristics, especially those in the institutional category, change over time.
Others, especially those in the geographical group, are xed, but their eect may change over time.
44The periods are 1834-1843,1843-1852,1852-1861, and 1861-1871, with the last period actually
lasting ten years.
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eect of a town`s size. In particular the strength of the eect is inuenced, smaller
towns should experience a larger impact. I investigate the strength of the eect along
the size distribution by estimating the dierence-in-dierence specication with size-
based subsamples. The results of the repeated estimation show the change in the
eect when either a number of the largest or smallest towns are dropped from the
sample.
Moving from size eects to spatial interaction, I investigate the existence of a
second-order eect of the changes in market access through the Zollverein. When
towns grow faster due to an exogenous increase in market access the model predicts
that this additional growth has also a positive eect on growth in related locations.








γjHcj + ε (5)
where Growth is the annualized growth rate, Marketk is market potential in neigbor
k, Hj is an element of the set of geographic and institutional variables, W is a spatial
weight matrix and ρ is the coecient on the spatial lag variable. This is done for three
periods, one before the Zollverein and two afterwards, to see whether these second
order eects are visible in addition to the rst order eect of the border liberalizations.
The equilibrium of the theoretical model works not only for a constant population,
but also for a growing one.(Redding and Sturm, 2008) There are two sources for the
growth of the total urban population in Saxony, namely natural increase through a
larger number of births than deaths, and migration, the move of rural population
into towns.45 This raises the question, which of these two growth mechanisms can
be inuenced by the shock to market access and therefore lead to dierential growth
between towns. To answer this question I utilize data about the sources of each town`s
population growth, migration or natural increase, which are available for the time
period 1834 - 1852.46 These numbers are used in a Seemingly Unrelated Regression
approach to determine which channel was aected by the Zollverein. The formal
45Foreign migration is during this time too small to make a substantial impact and will therefore
be lumped in with rural migration.
46The natural increase numbers are based on actual birth and deaths numbers, while migration is
implied by the dierence between natural increase and total population growth of a town.
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specication is






γjHcaj + εca (6)
where Growtha is the annualized growth rate in the period 1834 to 1852 due to
mechanism a, which is either migration or demographic change. Marketl is the
market potential in the relevant state and Hj are location characteristics. This set of
location characteristics contains an additional set of demographic variables besides the
geographic and institutional variables detailed above. The additions are the birth and
death rate in the town in 1834, the share of youth in the total population, the share
of widowed persons as well as the gender ratio. The coecients on these variables are
restricted to be zero for the equation estimating the growth due to migration.
6 Empirical Results
6.1 Urban Growth
The results of the initial specication, as shown in Table 2, clearly indicate that
market access changes inuenced town's growth rates and therefore their size. In
particular towns with larger relative market in Thuringia show a strong increase, while
towns with a larger market in Prussia also see a change, though it has a negative sign.
Although the eect of the Bohemian market has the right sign, it is not statistically
signicant. The domestic urban market, as expected, did not inuence changes in
growth rates.
The initial dierence-in-dierence specication demonstrates that the Zollverein
had a positive growth eect on towns close to the liberalized border. The two graphs
in Figure 1 depict the resulting treatment coecients from repeated estimations,
illustrating that the eect is statistically signicant and positive for towns within
certain distances from the border. The size of the eect is considerable, an absolute
dierence of about 0.5% growth a year implies for example that towns were 9.2% larger
after 15 years than they otherwise would have been. Especially the results using the
cost distance measure to determine towns`s distances to the border, and therefore the
treatment group, show a clear, monotone decreasing eect, conrming that the eect
weakens when towns further from the border are included in the treatment group.
The main specication takes these initial results further by demonstrating the
impact of the dierent markets. The specication investigates the separate eects,
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identied by dierential changes to the trade barriers with Saxony's three main neigh-
bor states. As described above, I use a grid search over possible distance to border
values to determine the necessary thresholds for both distance measures. The re-
sulting distances exhibit a further reach for the eect connected with the Prussian
borders, which is approximately two day walking trips deep.47 The corresponding
values for the eect of the Thuringian and Bohemian border correspond to about one
day of travel into Saxony. Maps 3 and 4 show their actual geographical location.
Using these border thresholds I estimate the baseline specication, outlined above,
with treatment groups based on either my cost measure or plain distance. Columns
1 and 3 in Table 3 show the resulting regression results. The purpose of the exten-
sion concerning location characteristics is to control whether they can explain the
observed dierential growth. Columns 2 and 4 show therefore results when I estimate
the specication with the same thresholds but correct for the inuence of location
characteristics.
The estimation results exhibit distinct eects for the three dierent borders, mir-
roring the results of the market potential based specication. The growth of towns
close to the Thuringian border exhibits a pattern in accordance with the model predic-
tions. The reduction of tolls and taris, some of them newly imposed in the aftermath
of the Napoleonic Wars, led to an increase in market access for Saxon towns close
to that border. Before the Zollverein these actually do grow slightly slower, though
statistically insignicantly so, than control towns. The trade liberalization through
the entry of Saxony and the Thuringian principalities causes a signicant and strong
increase in the growth rate for Saxon locations close to the border. The size of the
eect, approximately 0.72% higher annual growth for the baseline specications un-
der both distance measures, is robust for the inclusion of location characteristics.
It even increases slightly for the cost measure. The Zollverein had a clear, positive
and strongly signicant eect through the liberalization of the Saxon border with
Thuringia.48
Saxony shared its southern border with Bohemia, which as part of the Austrian
Empire did not join the Zollverein. Saxony's adoption of the Zollverein's external
47 Plain Measure: Prussia 26km,Thuringia 10km, Bohemia 17km; Cost Measure: Prussia 62km,
Thuringia 29km, Bohemia 31km
48As robustness checks. I conduct a median regression of the main dierence-in-dierence speci-
cation as well as a xed eects specication, the obtained results are consistent with the regular
OLS estimation.
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tari system, a considerable change from its prior free trade policy, led to an increase
in trade barriers between the two states. Such an increase in barriers implies a re-
duction in market access, in the above described theoretical framework in particular
a decrease in customer market access. The empirical results seem to correspond with
that prediction. Both baseline specications show no signicantly dierent growth
before the Zollverein, a small decrease in the growth rate afterwards, even turning
statistically signicant negative for the cost measure. Introducing the location charac-
teristics however changes the results considerably. The regression using cost measure
indicates that location characteristics, which are interacted with time period dum-
mies, can explain the negative growth after the Zollverein, showing that the eect
shown in the baseline specication is not primarily due to a change in market access.
A more detailed discussion about this is given in the context of the extension that
looks at the adjustment path of the eects. The results for the introduction of loca-
tion characteristics into the regression using the plain distance measure illustrate the
reduction in growth rates of aected towns due to the entry into the Zollverein and
no signicantly dierent growth between the treatment and control group afterwards.
For the case of towns aected by the liberalization with Prussia, the following
general pattern emerges from all four results. During the period 1815 to 1830 there
is a considerably higher growth of towns close to the Prussian border than for towns
in the control group. The eect is basically identical for both baseline specications
with an annual growth rate that is 0.5% higher. Introducing location characteristics
leads to a strengthening of the eect to 0.9% for the cost measure, while for the plain
measure the magnitude stays the same but turns statistically insignicant. However,
the results for the period after Saxony's entry into the Zollverein indicate that the
growth of towns close to this border is not dierent from the growth of towns in
central Saxony in any signicant way. At rst glance, these numbers are at variance
with the model predictions, which imply a higher growth after the Zollverein but not
before. This discrepancy is due to the fact that this border had been imposed in 1815,
when Prussia annexed considerable parts of northern Saxony. Although this implies
that town`s should have grown slower in the time period between the imposition in
1815 and the lifting of barriers in 1834, a related one-time migration eect reverses
the sign of the impact. In the appendix I investigate the impact of this separation
and the related migration eect quantitatively and reconcile the observed results with
the theoretical implications of the Zollverein.
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In summary, the results of the main specication show that the liberalization
of tari barriers and the increase in market access had strong positive eects on
the economic activity in aected towns, as shown in their population growth. The
eects appear to be very general, individual town characteristics cannot explain the
observed dierential growth. Especially the new markets in Thuringia to the west of
Saxony had a strong positive eect, the new access to markets in Prussia reversed
the imposition of barriers in 1815 and the higher barriers towards Bohemia had not
much of an impact.
6.2 Adjustment Path
This extension investigates the adjustment paths of the eects after the entry into the
Zollverein. This is achieved by including multiple periods after the Zollverein entry
into the baseline specication. The reduction of the length of these periods to nine
years allows the incorporation of four periods until 1871 and still avoids the impact
of short-term uctuations.49 The results are represented graphically in Figure 2 to
illustrate the development over time more clearly. The numbers follow the results of
the baseline specication detailed above very well.
Towns close to the Thuringian border exhibit no signicantly dierent growth be-
fore the Zollverein but a strong positive eect afterwards. The development indicates
that the eect grew stronger over time before dropping back considerably during the
1860s. The magnitude of the additional growth after the increase in market access
begins with 0.6% in the rst decade and then rises to about 0.9% over the next two
periods. During the 1860s the eect drops considerably to around 0.4% and becomes
statistically insignicant. The model does not make any predictions about the ad-
justment process, only species a new equilibrium as the outcome of the process. One
possible explanation for the observed path of the adjustment path, a strengthening
over time until a sudden drop, can be the nature of the adjustment mechanisms, mi-
gration and natural increase. Another possible reason is the Prussian-Austrian war
of 1866, which saw some of the Thuringian principalities taking the side of Prussia,
while Saxony allied itself with Austria.
The above discussion about the eect of the Bohemian border shows that the
inclusion of location characteristics led to a disappearance of a signicant eect. The
49 The last period, 1861-1871 contains ten years, the period before the Zollverein remains at 15
years due to data limitations.
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adjustment path sheds further light on this issue. While the coecients for the periods
after the Zollverein are generally negative, the eect in the cost measure specica-
tion for the 1843-1852 period is considerably stronger and statistically signicant.
Saxony, and Germany as a whole, experienced a series of bad harvests during these
years. The location characteristics introduced into the baseline specication contain
controls, especially of geographic nature, that take out the dierential eect of these
harvest failures due to underlying structural dierences.50 The border between Sax-
ony and Bohemia runs along the Erzgebirge, a mountainous range with less favorable
agricultural conditions. Towns in the vicinity were therefore harder hit by widespread
harvest failures due a strong dependency on grain imports. The timing of these fail-
ures corresponds well with the shape of the adjustment path, which implies that this
eect is not primarily due to the changes in market access by the Zollverein.
The positive eect close to the Prussian border is again visible for the time pe-
riod before the Zollverein. The coecients for the periods after the Zollverein entry
illustrate that there was no signicant dierence for town growth between towns in
the vicinity of the border and the control group. The development of this coecient
demonstrates that the trade liberalization with Prussia returned the situation to prior
1815, as discussed in the appendix
6.3 Size eects
The theoretical framework implies that the size of a town matters for the magnitude
of the eect. Market access aects the size of a town, but size might also inuence the
eect of market access changes on growth. To investigate this potentially dierential
impact I estimate the baseline dierence-in-dierence specication with subsamples
based on size. Figure 3 shows the eect of the liberalization of the Thuringian border
as well as that of the Prussian border before the Zollverein based on samples which
sequentially drop either the largest or the smallest towns from the respective samples.
Dropping small towns does not aect the coecients, but taking out large towns re-
sults in a considerable weakening of the eect for the Thuringian border. Contrary
to model predictions, which imply a stronger eect for smaller places, larger places
grew faster due to the increase in market access. A possible explanation is the exis-
tence of a threshold eect such that agglomeration economies did not exist below the
50Although the geographic variables are time-invariant, they are interacted with time period dum-
mies.
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threshold and consequently very small places did not see any eect of market access
changes at all. Such an eect corresponds well to the results of Ploeckl (2010a), which
uses a similar dataset covering Saxony's population in the middle of the 19th century
and related agricultural endowments to determine a size threshold for urbanization
of about 2000 inhabitants.
6.4 Spatial eects
Spatial econometrics is applied to look at additional spatial eects inuencing the
growth of towns. The interaction process between towns is modeled using two dierent
weight matrices. One contains a regular decay function, Wci =
1
dci
, and the other a
population weighted decay function, Wci =
Li
dci
. The rst matrix models a geographic
interaction process, where geographic proximity matters to explain inuence patterns.
The second matrix combines geographic proximity with the relative size of the market.
Using them I investigate spatial eects in growth patterns before and after the
Zollverein. These spatial patterns reveal indirect eects of the changes in market
access. The Zollverein caused an exogenous shock to market access of Saxon towns
by opening markets in neighbor states, a direct increase which led to higher growth.
Higher growth of each Saxon town increased the market access of other Saxon towns
additionally and should have led to a strengthening of the eect. To investigate
whether this additional growth mechanism was at work following the liberalization
of the Zollverein I apply a spatial lag specication. The growth transmission mech-
anism is modeled by the inclusion of a weighted sum of the dependent variables of
all observations, ρWy, as an independent variable in the specication, which is again
estimated using maximum likelihood. The two weight matrices introduced above are
used for the spatial term. The empirical specication is estimated for each of the three
periods separately and incorporates the eect of markets in other states by including
these individual market variables in the specication.51
The estimated values, as shown in Table 4, for the coecient on the spatial term
follow a specic pattern for both weight matrix specications. The value is negative,
though statistically insignicant, before the Zollverein, it turns positive and statisti-
cally signicant for the period after the access and reverts again to a negative and
insignicant eect in the later time period. These numbers show the postulated re-
51 The used time periods are 1815-1830 before the Zollverein, 1834-1849 and 1849-1864 after
Saxony's entry
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inforcement eect very clearly. Additional population growth in neighboring towns
due to a market access increase inuences growth in a signicant and positive way.
The underlying direct eect of the Zollverein, namely the increase in market access
abroad, is also statistically signicant and conrms the results of the main dierence-
in-dierence specications.52
6.5 Migration and Demographic change
The model incorporates full labor mobility as the mechanism to reallocate population.
However a growing total urban population implies that the two mechanisms behind
this growth, urban-rural migration and natural increase, are the relevant potential
sources for dierential growth of towns. Crozet (2004) shows that market potential
explains part of the contemporary regional migration pattern within European states.
Demographic pattern, births and deaths, are also inuenced by economic factors. The
Saxon statistical oce published data on the population change of towns between 1834
and 1852, separating the total growth into natural increase and net migration. The
demographic component is dened as the dierence between all births and deaths
during the time. Using that number and the total change in population the oce
then calculated net migration, which was not directly observed, as the dierence
between total growth and natural increase. The resulting number indicates the net
population change caused by migration for each town. Using these numbers for
migration and natural increase I estimate the above described seemingly unrelated
regression specication.
Table 5 shows the results.53 The eect of the market access variables reect the
results of the main dierence-in-dierence specication very well. The coecients on
the market potential in Thuringia show a signicantly positive eect for migration as
52The results also show that the eect of railroads on Saxon towns clearly lagged the eect of
the Zollverein. The controls show no signicant eect in the dierence-in-dierence specications
and the spatial growth regressions show that the eect is not signicant for the initial period after
the Zollverein, but strongly positive for the late period after 1849. Railroads clearly had an eect
on urban growth, though the timing indicates that the impact lagged the changes in market access
through the Zollverein for quite some time.
53The human capital variables show an interesting pattern. They exhibit a signicantly positive
eect for growth due to migration, which indicates that human capital has an importance for the
growth of towns. Since the coecients are insignicant, in one case even negative, for natural
increase this implies that the eect of human capital causes migratory eects, but doesn't seem to
aect demographic patterns .
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well as natural increase. Market potential in Prussia shows again no signicant eect
after the entry into the Zollverein. Market potential in Bohemia has a signicant
negative eect on migration behavior but not demographic change. This selective
eect of Bohemia conrms that this eect is due to the shock of bad harvests in the last
few years before the end of the investigated period. The eect of market potential in
Thuringia shows that the Zollverein had a sustained impact on the economic landscape
in Saxony. It shifted population into the more strongly aected regions, indicating
that the change in market access through the Zollverein caused a shift in the economic
situations of these regions. The positive eect on natural increase furthermore shows
that this institutional change and related economic growth aected not only migratory
patterns but also demographic ones.
The coecients on the demographic variables show a signicant positive eect on
growth due to natural increase. A higher birth rate has a positive eect and a higher
death rate has a negative eect, both as expected. A higher share of widowed people
leads to lower demographic growth, which is likely due to a lower number of marriages
as well as a higher share of older people. The last point is conrmed by the signicant
positive eect of a higher share of young people. The male/female gender ratio also
has a signicantly positive eect. Although these variables indicate that dierences in
the demographic characteristics of towns at the time of entry into the Zollverein had
an impact on population growth, the statistical signicance of the Thuringia market
access variable implies that the eect of the change in market access has a general
positive eect on natural increase.
The shown impact of market access on migration as well as natural increase allows
to calculate the contribution of the Zollverein to urbanization in Saxony. Urban pop-
ulation54 represented 32.6% of Saxony's total population in 1834 and 35.0% in 1852.
Converting the above results into changes in urbanization indicates that migration
due to the Zollverein led to an increase of 2.0% (or 1.4% using the plain distance
measure), and natural increase made an additional contribution of 0.7% (0.6%). This
implies that most of the rise in urbanization between 1834 and 1852 can be explained
as a result of the Zollverein. This complements nicely with the stagnation of urban-
ization prior to entry. The urbanization rate stayed at at 32.3% from 1815 to 1830.
Furthermore the total magnitude of the Zollverein eect of 2.7% (2.0%) is substantial
compared to the increase in urbanization during the height of the industrialization
54This continues to use the set of locations with town rights to determine urban settlements.
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process between 1852 and 1871, which was 4.6%. If changes in the the urbanization
rate are a good indicator for economic growth in a state, then the Zollverein not
only had a signicant impact on relative regional growth but also made a substantial
contribution to total growth, even in comparison to industrialization.
7 Distance Measure
The dierence-in-dierence approach to identify the eects of the Zollverein oers the
possibility to illustrate statistically the impact of including geography and infrastruc-
ture into distance measurement. The basis for the comparison is the determination of
the treatment groups based on the distance measure. The sets of towns assumed to
be aected by the Zollverein are selected using towns' distances to borders, resulting
in dierent groups for the two distance measures. The eect on the growth of towns,
which were selected by only of the two measures, allows to identify which of the two
measures selects the aected towns more precisely. The treatment groups based on




βplPlaincl ∗ PreZVt +
∑
l




γplPaincl ∗ ZVt +
∑
l
γl(Costcl − Plaincl) ∗ ZVt +
∑
j
λjHcj ∗ ZVt + δt + µc + ϵct
(7)
Plaincl and Costcl are dummies indicating whether a town is in the respective treat-
ment group for border l. PreZVt and ZVt are dummies indicating whether period t is
before or after the entry into the Zollverein. The factor (Costcl − Plaincl) illustrates
the dierence between the treatment groups for border l dened by the two distance
measures. It takes on value 1 if a town is in the group dened by the cost measure but
not in the group dened by the plain measure. The value -1 indicates the opposite,
that the town is part of the treatment group dened by the plain measure but not
part of the cost measure group. 0 indicates that the town is either part of both groups
or of no group.55 The specication also includes time dummies δt, regional dummies
µc and the set of location characteristics Hc.
The results are shown in Table 6. An F-test for the joint hypothesis that the
coecients on Plaincl are equal to the corresponding coecients on (Costcl−Plaincl),
55 The following number pairs indicate the dierences between the two treatment groups for the
three borders, the rst number is the count for +1 and the second is the count of -1. Thuringia
(2/0), Bohemia(0/30), Prussia(6/4).
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so βpl = βdl and γpl = γdl for all l, shows that this hypothesis cannot be rejected
at a 95% signicance level.56 This implies that towns which are in the treatment
group based on the cost measure but not in the treatment group based on the plain
measure experience the same eect as towns in the treatment group based on the
plain measure.57 This result conrms that the selection mechanism based on the cost
distance measure is more precise in identifying aected towns, illustrating the eect
of ignoring geography and infrastructure for distance measurement.
All the specications investigating the dierent aspects of the eect of the Zol-
lverein are estimated separately for both distance measures. This implies the use
of distance in two particular ways, rst to measure the relationship between two
locations in a continuous way, and second to delineate appropriate market areas,
measuring the relationship in a discrete way. A comparison of the results for the
specications using actual market potential, and based on continuous distance, show
only some indication of improvement, for example the signicance of market potential
in the growth mechanism regressions.
Saxony's geography is rather continuous, the mountain range along the southern
border is fairly low and oers sucient possibilities for safe passage. This in connec-
tion with a relative developed road network implied that the variation in transport
costs is not very extensive. This implies that an eect on long-distance trade, which
would only be substantially aected through major obstacles, i.e. high mountain
ranges, infrastructure-less areas like deserts, or major oceans, are between origin and
destination is not to be expected for this setting and conrmed by the results. Figure
4 shows that the relative dierences between the two measures are the starkest for
short distances,while for longer travels they appear to converge. This demonstrates
graphically that geography and infrastructure aect distance in an absolute rather
than relative way. It explains the clear improvement demonstrated above for the
use of distance to in a discreet way. The delineation of aected areas, especially
on a regional level, is strongly inuenced, leading to an improvement in the use of
distance. The shown example, the determination of treatment groups for the eect
56 The F-value is 1.93 and the p-value is 0.08. Testing the restriction on each coecient pair
individually shows that with one exception all have a p-value above 0.3. The dierence of the
coecients on the eect of the Bohemian border prior to the Zollverein however is statistically
highly signicant with a p-value of 0.0024.
57 Towns which are in the plain treatment group but not in the cost treatment group show a
dierent eect than the other towns in the plain treatment group and are indistinguishable from
towns in the control group.
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of the Zollverein, clearly illuminates the contribution the inclusion of geography and
infrastructure can make to the use of distance in measuring market access.
8 Conclusion
The Zollverein and Saxony's entry in 1834 present a clear and strong case of peaceful
border removal, leading to a clean impact on the market access of towns. This paper
utilizes dierences in this impact to identify whether and how these changes to market
access aected regional growth.
The opening of new markets through the Zollverein led to a strong increase in
population growth close to those new markets. This eect was especially pronounced
for towns close to Thuringia. These towns experienced an increase in annual growth
of about 0.7%. The trade liberalization between Saxony and Prussia reopened mar-
kets which had previously been closed due to the imposition of a new border in
1815. Migration caused by this imposition masked the expected negative economic
eects of this imposition and negated any dierential growth after the border open-
ing. The increase of barriers with the southern neighbor Bohemia had the expected
negative, though statistically insignicant, eect. The eects show persistence for
more than two decades, A town's size inuences the strength of the eect, which
also sees reinforcement through the eect on neighboring locations. Migration, as
well as natural increase, act as mechanisms to allow changes in market access induce
dierential growth. Furthermore the increase in integration was a catalyst for a sig-
nicant increase in urbanization as well. Institutional change, the peaceful creation
of a common market, shaped the spatial dimension of the population distribution and
economic activity in a signicant way
The analysis further shows that geography and infrastructure inuence market
access. GIS oers the possibility to include this factors into distance measurement,
improving the precision of these measures. The improvement is especially clear for
local and regional analysis, as well as the delineation of markets. Although market
access usually only looks at urban markets, especially in historical and less developed
the size and extent of rural markets may play an important role. As shown, geography
and infrastructure can aect them substantially and should be taken into account.
The results indicate that agglomeration played an important role in determining
the geographical distribution and growth of population and economic activity already
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at the onset of the Industrial Revolution. Further research into the interaction of
agglomeration, natural endowments and geography will be useful in illuminating how
these various forces interact and how they together shaped the historical development,
the industrial revolution and onset of modern economic growth.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variables Mean St.Dev Min Max
Population 1815 2779.41 5900.54 284.00 59217.00
Population 1834 3739.74 7425.40 449.00 73614.00
Population 1849 4730.59 9714.60 470.00 94092.00
Elevation 338.76 181.11 107.00 917.00
Ruggedness 29.12 16.34 3.73 94.26
Farm quality 43.30 14.62 17.00 91.00
Pasture quality 41.37 9.85 16.00 65.00
Temperature 71.76 10.69 40.00 90.00
Rain 781.20 114.93 551.00 999.00
Brown Coal 29.13 19.61 0.00 81.26
Stone Coal 30.55 19.35 0.13 93.87
River 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00
Elbe River 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00
Post oce in 1834 0.69 0.47 0.00 1.00
Rail service years (1849) 0.67 2.22 0.00 11.00
Newspaper 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
multiple Newspapers 0.06 0.25 0.00 1.00
General Trade Fair 0.93 0.26 0.00 1.00
Textile Fair 0.06 0.25 0.00 1.00
Animal Fair 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00
Housing stock 0.00 125.77 -563.86 418.15
Students/School 321.68 249.48 69.00 1630.50
Students/Teacher 129.04 55.86 28.85 346.00
Tertiary Institution 0.14 0.53 0.00 4.00
Mining population 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.24
Military population 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.30
Old age population share 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.15
Young age population share 0.33 0.03 0.24 0.40
Widowed share 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.09
Gender ratio 0.95 0.06 0.80 1.16
Further information about the individual variables, in particular their sources as well as units, is

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: Dierence-in-dierence Results
Specication Baseline Controls Baseline Controls
Distance Measure Cost Cost Plain Plain
Thuringia Pre-Zollverein -0.213 -0.359 -0.134 -0.233
(0.269) (0.321) (0.284) (0.352)
Thuringia Zollverein 0.725*** 0.844*** 0.73*** 0.76***
(0.234) (0.258) (0.256) (0.290)
Bohemia Pre-Zollverein -0.0744 0.210 0.333 0.782*
(0.225) (0.309) (0.232) (0.435)
Bohemia Zollverein -0.359** -0.0914 -0.0693 0.284
(0.148) (0.207) (0.118) (0.188)
Prussia Pre-Zollverein 0.498** 0.912*** 0.5* 0.538
(0.213) (0.305) (0.254) (0.433)
Prussia Zollverein -0.0551 0.0155 0.069 0.233
(0.171) (0.243) (0.188) (0.244)
Time Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 280 280 280 280
R-squared 0.688 0.67 0.685 0.67
Signicance Stars: *** signicant at 1 % level, ** signicant at 5 % level, * signicant at 10% level
Standard errors are clustered on towns
Location controls contain all geographical and institutional variables listed in the appendix. Regional
controls act as dummies for the main administrative regions of Saxony.(Magnitude and direction of
the coecients are robust to the exclusion of the regional controls) Time Controls indicate the







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: SUR Migration and Natural Increase
Equation Migration Natural Increase Migration Natural Inc.
Distance Measure Cost Cost Plain Plain
Thuringian Market 0.920* 0.493** 0.243 0.159
(0.466) (0.204) (0.226) (0.101)
Bohemian Market -1.16** 0.0517 0.521 0.0956
(0.547) (0.236) (0.38) (0.164)
Prussian Market -0.054 -0.0331 0.270 0.128
(0.179) (0.076) (0.254) (0.110)
Rural Market -0.0218 0.00454 -0.0438*** 0.0102
(0.0154) (0.00658) (0.0156) (0.0068)
Birthrate 1834 1.18** 11.5**
(4.92) (5.06)
Deathrate 1834 -9.53** -8.73**
(4.64) (4.77)
Gender balance 1.53*** 1.47***
(0.567) (0.564)
Widowed Share -6.02* -5.39
(3.41) (3.42)
Youth Share 2.55* 2.3*
(1.33) (1.35)
Inst. Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geogr. Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
adjusted R2 0.335 0.572 0.358 0.569
Signicance Stars: *** signicant at 1 % level, ** signicant at 5 % level, * signicant at 10% level
Market potential variables are rescaled by 1000. Demographic variables are the birth
and death rate in 1834, the gender balance (male/female) as well as the share of
widowed and young people (<14 years) in the town population.
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Table 6: Distance measure comparison
Type Coecient Standard Error N
Thuringia Pre-Zollverein Plain -0.130 0.356 20
Thuringia Pre-Zollverein Cost-Plain -0.668** 0.297 2
Thuringia Zollverein Plain 0.775*** 0.296 20
Thuringia Zollverein Cost-Plain 0.794*** 0.268 2
Bohemia Pre-Zollverein Plain 0.772 0.471 49
Bohemia Pre-Zollverein Cost-Plain -0.156 0.354 30
Bohemia Zollverein Plain 0.128 0.318 49
Bohemia Zollverein Cost-Plain -0.162 0.234 30
Prussia Pre-Zollverein Plain 1.02** 0.417 43
Prussia Pre-Zollverein Cost-Plain 1.14** 0.45 10
Prussia Zollverein Plain 0.155 0.259 43
Prussia Zollverein Cost-Plain -0.165 0.285 10
Regional Controls Yes Yes
Regional Controls Yes Yes
Location Controls Yes Yes
Observations 280 280
R2 0.68
Signicance Stars: *** signicant at 1 % level, ** signicant at 5 % level, * signicant at 10% level
Standard errors clustered on towns
N indicates the size of the respective treatment group. Type indicates whether the
variable equals the treatment groups dened with the plain measure (Plain), or the
dierence between the treatment groups dened by the two measures (Cost-Plain).




Figure 1: Treatment eect of the Zollverein with dierent selection thresholds
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The graph plots the series of treatment eects of specifying dierence-in-dierence estimations with
one treatment group, namely towns close to Saxony's border with another Zollverein member. The
selection of the treatment groups diers by the applied threshold distance from the border, which is
plotted on the x-axis. The numbers above the x-axis indicate the number of towns in the treatment
group for the corresponding distance threshold.
Figure 2: Adjustment path of all three treatment eects

























Black filled marker indicates statistical signficance
1834 Zollverein
This graph shows the development of the three treatment eects over time, using the cost measure
to determine the treatment group.
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Figure 3: Thuringian / Prussian treatment eect for subsamples selected on size
















































The panel shows the treatment eects of the Prussian border for 1815-1830 and for the Thuringian
border after the Zollverein. For n < 60, the n-largest towns are excluded from the sample. For n
> 80, the sample contains the n-largest towns, so the 140− n smallest towns are excluded from the
sample.
Figure 4: Ratio of cost to plain distance versus plain distance
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Maps
Map 1: Political borders of Saxony and neighbor states


















This map shows the political borders of Saxony and its neighbor states in 1834.
Additionally the external Zollverein border is marked.
Map 2: Borders of the Zollverein in 1834
This map shows the extent of the Zollverein in 1834.
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Treatment groups based on plain and cost distance
Maps 3 and 4 demonstrate the impact caused by using the detailed cost distance
measure to determine distance from border. They illustrate graphically the location
of towns in Saxony and neighbor states as well as the distance thresholds for the
dierence-in-dierence estimation. A full black dot indicates a Saxon town, and an
empty dot indicates a town in a neighboring state used to calculate market access. The
lightly shaded areas indicate the respective neighbor states, the strongly colored areas
are the parts of Saxony that are the respective treatment regions of the dierence-
in-dierence estimation. Towns within the area with a white background represent
the control group used in the estimation. The rst illustrates the thresholds based on






The following lists the sources for the population data used in the analysis.
Saxony Statistische Mitteilungen aus dem Koenigreich Sachsen (1831 - 1849,1851 -
1855)
Statistisches Jahrbuch Sachsen (1871-1938)
Zeitschrift des königlich Sächsischen Statistischen Landesamtes (1855-1945)
Historisches Ortsverzeichnis Sachsen, 2006
TOP 50 Sachsen, CD-ROM,Landesvermessungsamt Sachsen
Prussia Homann, J.G., "Die Bevoelkerung des Preussischen Staates", Nicolaische
Buchhandlung, Berlin 1839
Tabellen und amtliche Nachrichten ueber den Preussischen Staat fuer das Jahr
1852 (Herausgegeben von dem statistischen Bureau zu Berlin Druck und Verlag
von A.W.Hayn 1855)
Bavaria Beitraege zur Statistik des Koenigreichs Bayern Nr 1, 13
Thuringia Statistik Thueringens, Mitteilungen des Statistischen Vereins Vereinigter
Thueringischer Staaten
Beitraege zur Statistik des Grossherzogtums Sachsen-Weimar-Eisenach
Bohemia Statistisches Handbuch des Koenigreichs Boehmen, 1913
Becher, Siegfried, "Statistische Uebersicht der Bevoelkerung der oesterreichis-
chen Monarchie", Verlag der Cotta'schen Buchhandlung, Stuttgart 1841
Geographic data
The following lists the data sources for geographic data:
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Historical Maps
Historischer Atlas von Sachsen , Karte und Beiheft A 9 ,B II 6, F IV 1, H 16
Bayerische Landesbibliothek, Muenchen
Ref: VIII 21, VIII 23c , VIII 46, XII 118
Saechsisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Dresden
Ref: 11345/15, 11345/16, 12884, R926
GIS data
Historical Borders: HGIS Germany ( IEG Mainz ,i3mainz Fachhochschule Mainz)
www.hgis-germany.de
River network: Saechsisches Ministerium fuer Umwelt und Landwirtschaft:
-Gewässerdurchgaengigkeitsprogramm (Oberaechengewaesser)
Elevation: U.S.Geological Survey, National Elevation Data
Location Characteristics
The following gives a description for each of the variables used for location charac-
teristics.
Natural endowment
Elevation This variable indicates the elevation over sea level measured in meters;
the data are from current digital elevation models.
Source:U.S.Geological Survey ,National Elevation Data
Ruggedness This variable indicates the atness of the area immediately surrounding
the town. The elevation prole of an area inuences agricultural suitability as
well as ease of transportation. I specify this as the standard deviation of all
elevation values within a two kilometer radius of the town's location.
Source:U.S.Geological Survey ,National Elevation Data
Farmland quality This variable indicates the quality of the soil with respect to
farming purposes, based on public geological surveys during the middle of the
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20th century. The surveys are based on thousands of measurements, and report
average values for about 1600 parishes covering all of Saxony. The classica-
tion scheme uses a scale of 0-100, which is the same specication used for the
empirical analysis.Saechsisches
Source: Ministerium fuer Umwelt und Landwirtschaft:GEMDAT-LABODatabase,
Akademie der Landwirtschaft der DDR, Muencheberg-Eberswalde
Pasture quality This variable indicates the quality of the soil with respect to pas-
ture purposes. The data are based on the same surveys as the farmland quality
and the variable is specied in the same way.
Source: Ministerium fuer Umwelt und Landwirtschaft:GEMDAT-LABODatabase,
Akademie der Landwirtschaft der DDR, Muencheberg-Eberswalde
Temperature This variable indicates the suitability of a location's annual temper-
ature with respect to agricultural purposes. The data are based on the same
surveys as the farmland quality and the variable is specied in the same way.
Source: Ministerium fuer Umwelt und Landwirtschaft:GEMDAT-LABODatabase,
Akademie der Landwirtschaft der DDR, Muencheberg-Eberswalde
Rain This variable indicates the average rainfall at the location. The data are based
on the same surveys as the farmland quality.
Source: Ministerium fuer Umwelt und Landwirtschaft:GEMDAT-LABODatabase,
Akademie der Landwirtschaft der DDR, Muencheberg-Eberswalde
Brown Coal 58 This variable indicates the distance to brown coal mines active in
the late 1830s and early 1840s. The data about active mining locations come
from the Historical Atlas of Saxony. The distance is specied in kilometers and
is either measured as plain distance or with an introduced cost measure, and
enters quadratically into the regressions.
Source: Historischer Atlas von Sachsen , Karte und Beiheft A 9
Stone Coal This variable indicates the distance to hard coal mines active in the late
1830s and early 1840s, the data for which derive from the Historical Atlas of
Saxony. The data are specied in the same way as those for brown coal.
Source: Historischer Atlas von Sachsen , Karte und Beiheft A 9
58 The terminology relating to coal varieties is not uniform, so I follow the convention used by
Saxon statistical ocials and distinguish between "Braunkohle" and "Steinkohle". Braunkohle is
literally translated as "brown coal", while Steinkohle is "stone coal".
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Rivers This variable indicates whether there is a owing water body within a kilo-
meter of the town location, which is specied as a simple dummy variable.
Source: Saechsisches Ministerium fuer Umwelt und Landwirtschaft: -Gewässerdurchgängigkeitsprogramm
(Oberächengewässer)
Institution and Infrastructure
Elbe One of the major means of transportation in the early 19th century was ship-
ping, especially so on rivers. In Saxony, only the Elbe oered this possibility, as
no other river was navigable. Rivers also have other eects such as as a source
of energy, but this variable captures the eect of shipping, since most Saxon
towns were located at rivers. The variable is a dummy, indicating whether the
Elbe ows through the town.
Postal service This variable indicates whether the town had a regular postal service
in a given year. The data are taken from a compilation accompanying the
Historical Atlas of Saxony.
Source: Historischer Atlas von Sachsen , Karte und Beiheft
Rail service This variable indicates whether and for how long the town had a railway
station within the investigated period. It is specied as the number of years
the station was operating during this time period. The data are from the same
source as the information about the postal service.
Source: Historischer Atlas von Sachsen , Karte und Beiheft A 9
Newspapers These dummy variables indicate whether a newspaper or similar publi-
cation was published in the town in 1832, with the second variable indicating at
least two publications present. The data were published b the Saxon Statistical
Oce.
Source: Mittheilungen des statistischen Vereins fuer das Koenigreich Sach-
sen,1833
Trade fairs These are dummy variables for the existence of trade fairs in 1836, with
fairs classied into three categories: general goods, animals and textiles.
Source: Mittheilungen des statistischen Vereins fuer das Koenigreich Sachsen,
1835
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Housing This is a variable indicating the stock of housing in each town in 1834. The
stock is specied by the number of houses, without any regard to size or quality.
Since larger towns tend to have larger houses, the variable is the residual not
explained by a polynomial of the town's population. The data were collected
simultaneously with the census numbers and published in the same location.
Souce: Zeitschrift des königlich ächsischen Statistischen Landesamtes , 1901-
1902
Education These variables indicate the level of educational activity in each town.
"Tertiary Institutions" indicates whether there were any schools beyond regular
schools, for example a university, seminary or teacher college, "Teacher" indi-
cates the number of students per teacher in this town, and "School" indicates
the number of students per school in the town. The numbers are taken from an
overview by the Statistical Oce, published in 1833.
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Appendix Prussian Migration
The estimation results indicate that there was a signicantly higher population growth
close to the Prussian border prior to the Zollverein and no signicant dierent growth
afterwards. This result is contrary to the model implication of higher growth in the
period after the entry due to the market liberalization by the Zollverein. However,
this border was actually imposed in 1815, an event which also caused a one-time
migration from Prussia to Saxony. This migration, the size of which is unknown,
overshadows the eect of market access change. I use a conjecture about the number
of migrants to derive a hypothetical population distribution for the year 1830 without
this migration. These conjectured town sizes are then used to illustrate that the
results can be reconciled with the model implications.
The border between Saxony and Prussia was drawn and imposed by the Congress
of Vienna in 1815. Although Saxony was one of the latecomers as an ally of France,
it had stayed on France's side longer than most other German states. As a result
Prussia was given the right to annex substantial parts of Northern Saxony, leading to
the imposition of this arbitrarily-drawn new border (Kohlschmidt, 1930; Keller, 2002).
The ocial annexation agreement also contained a provision which let people migrate
freely from the newly annexed Prussian territories into the remaining Saxon state.
There are no records available for the actual size of this migration, but Kiesewetter
(2007) reports estimates for the total net migration between Saxony and abroad in
three years intervals for the time period between 1815 and 1830.
Based on a conjectured magnitude of the migration from Prussia to Saxony based
on Kiesewetter's numbers, I investigate whether this one-time event can explain the
observed eect. The conjecture is used to derive a counterfactual population distribu-
tion for the year 1830. The main assumptions are that all migrants move from a Prus-
sian town that was formerly Saxon into a town on the Saxon side of this border; I use
towns in the Prussian border treatment group as destination towns. The magnitude of








where p and s index the sets of origin towns within Prussia and destination towns
within Saxony, L is the respective town size, d is the distance between the two towns
and Migrants is the total number of migrants.59 Summing up all ows into one
59 This calculation uses a gravity approach in determining migration ows, the level of which
depends on the size of the source and destination towns as well as the distance between them.
Alternative approaches lead to similar eects.
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Figure 1: Counterfactual eect of the Prussian border imposition in 1815




















































particular town allows me to calculate its conjectured population in 1830 and the
implied growth rate between 1815 and 1830.
Estimating the main dierence-in-dierence specication with this implied growth
rate results in a conjectured coecient for the eect of the Prussian border prior to
the Zollverein. I use the specication with my cost measure and included location
characteristics and estimate it repeatedly, varying the distance threshold for the se-
lection of the treatment group aected by the Prussian border.60The following gure
plots the resulting coecients for the Prussian border before the Zollverein for dis-
tance thresholds ranging from 20km to 70km. The three panels in this gure show
the coecients for the Prussia treatment group prior to the Zollverein for three dif-
ferent assumed migration ows from Prussia, starting with one thousand, then eleven
thousand and nishing with twenty thousand people moving. Each panel illustrates
the eect of the varying treatment group thresholds. There are two main results
visible. One is that under fairly strong assumptions about the size of the migration
ow connected with the border imposition of 1815 the seemingly positive eect can
be reduced to insignicance and even turned negative. This brings the results much
more in line with model predictions, which imply that the imposition of the border
60 I keep the thresholds connected with the other two borders xed.
52
and its impact on market access should lead to a slower growth of stronger aected
towns.
Second, the results also show the spatial dimension of this eect. To illustrate this
more clearly I split the set of towns close to the Prussian border into three subsets
according to their distance from the border. The additional thresholds are at 23km
and 43km. The following table gives the results for the estimation of this specication,
which is otherwise identical to the main specication with location characteristics
controls. The time period after the Zollverein again sees no dierent growth between
towns in the Prussian treatment groups and the control group. But the rst time
period does see a new pattern. Towns in the treatment group closest to the border as
well as in the third, which is furthest away from the border, see high positive growth,
while those in the middle band do not see any statistically signicant dierent growth
compared to the control group. These results indicate that the original pattern is due
to two distinct eects; the strong positive eect close to the border is the result of
the migration from Prussia, while at the same time there is a shift from the two
bands closer to the border into the third band and closer to the remaining markets
in Saxony.
The imposition of the border in 1815 and the resulting market access changes
actually had the expected eect, reducing growth close to the border and shifting
economic activity towards remaining market access. The additional migration from
Prussia compensated for that eect, which removed the need for any further adjust-
ment when the border got liberalized again through the Zollverein. In other words
I can reasonably conclude that the puzzling result for growth close to the Prussian
border prior to the Zollverein reects the movement of migrants into Saxony.
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Table 7: Multiple Prussian Treatment groups
Band Cost Plain
Prussia Pre-Zollverein 0-23km/0-6km 1.03** 1.28*
0.454 0.727
Prussia Pre-Zollverein 23-43km/6-18km -0.146 0.0294
0.456 0.506
Prussia Pre-Zollverein 43-62km/18-26km 1.40*** 0.896*
0.382 0.467
Prussia Zollverein 0-23km/0-6km -0.0972 0.0789
0.32 0.493
Prussia Zollverein 23-43km/6-18km -0.128 0.327
0.3 0.323
Prussia Zollverein 43-62km/18-26km -0.033 0.192
0.264 0.259
Thuringia Pre-Zollverein -0.443 -0.125
0.308 0.347
Thuringia Zollverein 0.854** 0.797***
0.259 0.296
Bohemia Pre-Zollverein 0.079 0.726*
0.302 0.407
Bohemia Zollverein -0.0705 0.280
0.209 0.195
Regional Controls Yes Yes
Location Controls Yes Yes
Observations 280 280
R2 0.694 0.68
Signicance Stars: *** signicant at 1 % level, ** signicant at 5 % level, * signicant at 10% level
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Appendix Geographic Information Systems
The descriptions of the GIS functionalities in this section are predominantly based
on the ESRI ArcGis program documentation.
Basic Data Concepts
Geographical Information systems employ two distinct concepts to conceptualize and
map data  a raster and a vector system.
The raster approach uses information as a digital image, where a map is a grid of
cells with each cell having x, y and z coordinates. The x and y coordinates give the
location within the grid, while the z coordinate contains specic numerical informa-
tion. Possible examples for z are the elevation value of this cell, a measure of distance
to a specic point, or a category value indicating a specic surface (e.g. 0 indicates
empty land, 1 indicates a road, 2 indicates a river, etc.).
The vector approach uses information as geometrical objects. The basic object
shape is a point, which requires geographic (x,y) coordinates. It is possible to assign
for each point a table of information (e.g. a point can represent a town, where the table
stores the name, population, etc.). This information does not have to be numeric.
Connecting points results in two more relevant shape forms, known as "polylines"
and "polygons". The connecting lines can be straight or curved. Similar to points,
information can be assigned to each object. In the case of polygons, this information
is assigned to the area enclosed by the polygon as well. An example for a polyline is
a river or a road, while a polygon example is the territory of a state.
It is possible to transform data from one approach to the other. For example, I
present information about rivers in Saxony given in vector form, which I transform
into a grid to combine it with other raster data.
The relative positions (x,y-coordinates) in both approaches can be connected to
geographic reference positions, which allows linking multiple data sources. In the case
of raster data, this geo-referencing also allows the inference of other cell properties,
for example cell size. The elevation raster I use for Saxony has the property that each
grid cell represents a surface area of about 100 by 100 meters.
It is possible to perform mathematical operations on geographical data, especially
on raster data. The transformation usually operates on each cell individually, so it
is, for example, feasible to add or multiply each grid cell with a constant. It is also
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possible to multiply two or more layers where the resulting layer contains the product
of the corresponding grid cells. Transformations can also be executed on selected
cells, for example all cells with negative values could be set to zero or all cells within
a certain distance to specied source cells could be set to a constant.
Cost layer
I apply mathematical transformations to combine source layers into one cost layer,
which is then used in the distance measurement procedure described below. The goal
is to create a layer, the z-value of which indicates the cost of crossing this cell. The
distance calculation takes elevation patterns into account separately, so the cost layer
combines roads and rivers. Relative cost factors are parameter values that can be
changed relatively easily; however, each change in the cost layer requires the distance
calculation described below to be run again.
Roads The data for roads are based on information from a number of historical
maps.Maps drawn in 1834 show the network of major trade routes spanning
Saxony and its neighbors; road classications are quite consistent between them.
The resulting network is illustrated in the following map. As the benchmark
transportation cost I use major trade routes, to which I assign all major roads
which either saw service by Eilwagen, regular priority people transportation, or
were chauseed. Small roads are all other marked important road connections.
The exact routes within Saxony are based on a detailed 1852 Saxony road
map. Major roads have a cost factor of one, small roads of two and for areas
o one these roads I assign a cost factor of ve. These values are based on
historical cost transportation comparisons taken fromClark and Haswell (1964).
The estimation results based on the cost measure derived with these values are
very robust to changes in them. How exactly these cost factors translates into
distance will be explained in the description of the distance measurement.
Rivers I have information from the Saxon Landesvermessungsamt about the net-
work of rivers in Saxony. As mentioned above, the main navigable river within
Saxony is the Elbe, which saw considerable commercial shipping during this
time. Therefore, I assign a cost factor of 0.4 to the Elbe, while for all other
rivers, as well as the middle of the Elbe, I assign a cost factor of 25 to model the
cost of crossing a river not on a major trade route.(Aldcroft, 1986) Naturally,
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Figure 2: Map of road network in Saxony in 1834
rivers and roads cross, and given the assumption of existing bridges and fords
the road cost value is used for that particular cell.
Elevation As described below, elevation enters slightly dierently into the calcula-
tion than roads and rivers. One is the increase in actual traveled distance and
the second way is the inclusion of costs due to the slope, which is described
under the vertical factor heading below. I choose that slopes steeper than +-10
degrees cannot be followed and the slope costs are a multiplicative factor based
on an inverse linear function V F = 1
1−0.1∗Slope . This choice of functional form is
based on its appropriateness for the impact on transportation costs. Again the
estimation results are very robust to the precise shape of the specied function.
PathDistance function
The objective of the PathDistance cost function is for each cell location in the grid to
determine the least costly path to reach this cell from the least costly source. Each
cell will need to determine the least accumulative cost path from a source, the source
that allows for the least cost path and the least cost path itself. The formula used by
PathDistance to calculate the total cost from cell a to cell b is:
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Costdistance = Surfacedistance ∗ V erticalfactor
Source cells All cost functions require a source raster, which may contain single or
multiple zones. These zones may or may not be connected. The original values
assigned to the source cells are retained, and there is no limit to the number
of source cells within the source raster. As a practical example, one class of
source cells is the cells in which towns are located. These are usually single
unconnected cells. An example for a zone of connected cells is a border line.
Source cells can either be selected cells in a raster, or vector-based objects such
as points (e.g. each town is represented by a point).
Cost layer The cost raster can be a single raster, which is generally the result of
combining multiple rasters. The units assigned to the cost raster can be any
type of cost desired. The dollar cost, time, the energy expended, or a unitless
system would derive its meaning relative to the cost assigned to other cells. The
cost surface can be either a oating point or an integer raster. My cost layer,
described above, is a unit-less system. The applied cost layer is shown in the
following map:
Distance units Cost distance functions apply distance in cost units, not in geo-
graphic units. The cost values assigned to each cell are per unit distance mea-
sures for the cell. That is, if the cell size is expressed in meters, the cost
assigned to the cell is the cost necessary to travel one meter within the cell.
If the resolution is 50 meters, the total cost to travel either horizontally or
vertically through the cell would be the cost assigned to the cell times the
resolution (totalcost = cost ∗ 50). To travel diagonally through the cell, the
total cost would be 1.414214 times the cost of the cell, times the cell resolution
(totaldiagonalcost = 1.414214[cost ∗ 50]). Given the structure of my cost layer,
the resulting total cost for any path indicates the distance that could be traveled
on a at surface with cost factor 1 at the same cost.
Surface distance The surface distance is the actual ground distance (as opposed to
map or planimetric distance) that must be traveled when moving from one cell
(FROM) to another (TO). The rst step in calculating the surface distance is
to produce a right triangle, the base of which is derived from the cell size and
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Figure 3: Costlayer for distance calculations
whose height is the z-value dened by the input surface raster for the FROM
cell, minus the z-value of the TO cell. To determine the actual surface distance,
the third side of the right triangle is calculated using the Pythagorean theorem
(a2 + b2 = c2).
Vertical factors The vertical factors (VFs) determine the diculty of moving from
one cell to another, while accounting for the vertical elements that may aect
the movement. To determine the VF for moving from one cell to the next, the
slope between the FROM cell and the TO cell is calculated from the values
dened in the input vertical factor raster. The resulting slope is the vertical
relative moving angle (VRMA), which is used as the argument for a function
determining the vertical factor in the PathDistance calculations for the cell-to-
cell movement. This vertical factor establishes the vertical factor from the center
of the starting cell to the center of the destination cell. The VRMA is specied
in degrees and its range is from -90 to +90 degrees, compensating for both
positive and negative slopes. The resolution of the VRMAs used to determine
the vertical factor is 0.25 degrees. ArcGis has a range of available functions
for the determination of the vertical factor. For example, one possibility is a
linear transformation, while others are of polynomial or trigonometric nature.
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There is also the possibility of specifying a cutting angle, such that for any
angle steeper (or shallower) than this, the vertical factor becomes innity and
transportation impossible on this path.
Distance Extraction The cost function creates a grid, where each cell contains
the distance value to the nearest source cell. A graphical representation of a
resulting grid is given in Map 6. To calculate the distance between town A and
town B, I apply the cost function with town A as the sole source cell. It is then
possible to extract the distance value for town B, which has a point shape, and
add it to its table of information. Since the distance is not symmetric, I have to
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